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EvidenceCm n f: ~ Doctor-Patient Privilege 
Doctor, Doctor, Mr. M.D.: 
Dr./Patient privilege in MT 
"I was feeling so bad 
I asked my family doctor just what I had, 
I said 'Doctor, Doctor, Mr. M.D., 
Can you tell me what's ailing me?"' 
- "Good Lovin"' by the Young Rascals 
Any doctor worth her salt would need to know a bit more 
before providing an answer to the question (diagnosis) and a 
solution (prescription). The necessary additional information 
comes, at least in part, from the patient's own description of the 
symptoms and their inception. The "history" component of the 
patient's visit reflects the doctor's notes about what the patient 
told her, and often contains extremely sensitive information that 
may help the physician discern and/or fix the medical problem. 
Doctors and patients generally assume that the patient's 
disclosures are confidential and intend to keep them that way. 
The law has a different understanding of the situation, and in 
many cases can compel both production of the written medical 
record and oral testimony about what was said in the "privacy" 
of the doctor's office. Thus, the doctor-patient privilege differs 
significantly from the attorney-client and spousal privileges. 
As I have discussed in earlier columns, every asser-
tion of privilege necessarily deprives the fact-finder of valuable 
information. The Legislature's extension of privilege to com-
munications between parties to certain relationships reflects the 
judgment that society will benefit more from candid discussions 
in those relationships than it will lose from disclosure of those 
discussions. A doctor-patient privilege encourages patients 
to provide doctors with full information, and thus allows the 
doctors to make accurate diagnoses and optimal treatment. 
However, as I develop below, the doctor-patient privilege is not 
a sure bet, and the many limitations on it should cause a patient 
to be wary of full disclosure of unfavorable information to his 
treating physician. In turn, that rational wariness on the part of 
the patient may prevent the ultimate aim of the privilege in the 
first place: getting the patient better. 
A. Medical Ethics Favor Confidentiality 
Can the doctor voluntarily disclose what the patient told 
her? The American Medical Association says no, as a matter of 
medical ethics: 
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Opinion 5.05 - Confidentiality 
The information disclosed to a physician by a patient 
should be held in confidence. The patient should feel free 
to make a full disclosure of information to the physician 
in order that the physician may most effectively provide 
needed services. The patient should be able to make this 
disclosure with the knowledge that the physician will 
respect the confidential nature of the communication. 
The physician should not reveal confidential information 
without the express consent of the patient, subject to 
certain exceptions which are ethically justified because 
of overriding considerations. 1 
The AMA acknowledges the possibility that the law may 
have a different view of the confidentiality of patient commu-
nications, and instructs a doctor in this situation to first inform 
the patient, presumably to allow the patient's lawyer to analyze 
the legal situation and try to prevent the disclosure if possible: 
When the disclosure of confidential information is 
required by law or court order, physicians generally 
should notify the patient. Physicians should disclose 
the minimal information required by law, advocate 
for the protection of confidential information and, 
if appropriate, seek a change in the law. (III, IV, VII, 
VIII).2 
B. The Legal Landscape 
The question now becomes whether and when the law will 
require, and a court order, a physician to testify or provide re-
cords reflecting communications made by a patient. The answer 
depends on what court system is involved, and within that court 
system, on what kind of case. Federal courts do not recognize 
any doctor-patient privilege in federal criminal and federal 
question civil cases, although one may occur in diversity cases. 
On the other hand, Montana state law recognizes a doctor-
patient privilege in civil cases but not in criminal cases, and even 
in those civil cases, provides for ready waiver of the privilege. 
1 http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/ pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-
medical-ethics/opinionSOS.page, last accessed 8/11/2014. The exceptions listed 
by the AMA are two: where the patient threatens serious bodily injury to himself 
or another, and where a court orders disclosure. 




Montana's Statutory Doctor-Patient Privilege 
~011tana state law provides an evidentia.ry pr_ivilege for com-
murucatlons from a patient to his doctor. M.C.A. 26-1-805. first 
enacted in 1867, provides: 
26-1-805. Doctor-patient privilege. 
Except as provided in Rule 35, Montana Rules of Civil 
Proce~ure, a licensed physician, surgeon, or dentist may 
not, without the consent of the patient, be examined in a 
civil action as to any information acquired in attending 
the patient that was necessary to enable the physician, 
surgeon, or dentist to prescribe or act for the patient. 
A communication described in 45-9-104(7) is not a 
privileged communication. (Emphasis added) 
A. There is no doctor-patient privilege in Montana crimi-
nal actions 
First and foremost, this privilege applies only in civil cases: 
"in a civil action" means "not in a criminal action." Thus, there 
is no doctor-patient privilege in criminal cases in Montana state 
courts. The Montana Supreme Court so held, basing its opin-
ion on the express language (bolded above) in the statute, in its 
single case on the subject, State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 405 
P.2d 978 (1965). 
Campbell was convicted of murdering his fiancee as she 
ended her waitressing shift early one morning in Twin Bridges. 
The admitted evidence against him included a bullet taken from 
the defendant's own body (he apparently shot himself a couple 
of times after he shot the victim, to make it look like a third 
person had assaulted both). The doctor who treated Campbell 
removed and kept the bullet at Campbell's request, "until turn-
ing it over to law enforcement, pursuant to a court order."3 
After rejecting Campbell's argument that the removal of the 
bullet amounted to unconstitutional search and seizure, the 
Court went on to deny his doctor-patient privilege argument: 
Also in connection with the admission of the bullet 
and X-rays, appellant urges that the physician-patient 
privilege was violated. We hold with the great weight of 
authority that this privilege is not available to appellant 
in a criminal prosecution. See Anno.: 45 A.L.R. 1357, 
superseded in 2 A.L.R.2d 647. The applicable statute in 
Montana is R.C.M.1947, § 93-701-4, which provides in 
part: 
'There are particular relations in which it is the policy 
of the law to encourage confidence and preserve it 
inviolate; therefore, a person cannot be examined as a 
witness in the following cases: 
*** 
'4. A licensed physician or surgeon cannot, without the 
consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as 
to any information acquired in attending the patient, 
3 146 Mont. at 257, 405 P.2d at 984. 
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which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act 
for the patient.' 
R.C.M.1947, § 94-7209, provides: 
'The rules of evidence in civil actions are applicable also 
to criminal actions, except as otherwise provided in this 
code.' Section 94-7209, by its language, incorporates 
into criminal procedure all that is applicable of Title 
93, the Code of Civil Procedure. The one qualification 
is 'except as otherwise provided by this code.' Section 
93-701-4 sets forth five privileged relationships in 
addition to that of physician-patient. Only in the case 
of the physician-patient (sub-section 4) and one other 
relationship (sub-section 6) is the qualifying language 
'in a civil action' used. This would seem to be the kind 
oflanguage limiting a rule to civil procedure alone as 
was contemplated in the Provision in Section 94-7209, 
'except as otherwise provided in this code.' Such a 
construction is consistent with that given to essentially 
the same statutes by the State of California. See People 
v. West, 106 Cal. 89, 39 P. 207; People v. Dutton, 62 Cal. 
App.2d 862, 145 P.2d 676. (Emphasis added) 
State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 260-61, 405 P.2d 978, 
984 (1965). 
B. There especially is no doctor-patient privilege in crimi-
nal cases for fraudulently obtaining prescriptions for danger-
ous drugs. 
The last sentence of Montana's doctor-patient privilege 
states: "A communication described in 45-9-104(7) is not a 
privileged communication." M.C.A. 45-9-104 is part of Title 
45, entitled "Crimes." The subject of the title's Chapter 9 is 
"Dangerous Drugs.'' The specific statute, 45-9-104, deals with 
"the offense of fraudulently obtaining dangerous drugs;" subsec-
tion (7) says: 
(7) knowingly or purposefully communicating false or 
incomplete information to a practitioner with the intent 
to procure the administration of or a prescription for a 
dangerous drug. A communication of this information 
for the purpose provided in this subsection is not a 
privileged communication. 
Because no doctor-patient privilege exists in criminal cases, 
the two corollary sentences in the privilege and dangerous drug 
statutes are technically unnecessary. Anything the patient said to 
the doctor is admissible in any criminal prosecution (if relevant, 
etc.), regardless of the patient's innocent or criminal purpose in 
providing the information. Both of these sentences were added 
to the Code by 2011 Montana Laws Ch. 194 (S.B. 210), perhaps 
with the simple idea of making it clear that there really, really, 
really is no privilege in these cases, really. 
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C. In civil cases, Rule 35 waives doctor-patient privilege 
when the patient's condition is in controversy, either as a 
claim or a defense, and when the patient requests a copy of 
the other party's Rule 35 examination report. 
The first phrase of the doctor-patient privilege is "Except 
as provided in Rule 35, Montann Rules of Civil Procedure." 
M.R.Civ.P. 35 (oh, howl love this intersection of Civil 
Procedure and Evidence), part of the dis ovcry section of the 
rules, covers physical and mental examinations. As you recall, 
a party may obtain (by agreement or court order, not auto-
matically) a physical or mental e,xaminati.on of a person whose 
condition is "in controversy." 
The opponent and the person examined are entitle<l, 
upon request, to a copy of the examiner's report. Rule 35 
appears to impose, as a cost to such a request, the loss of the per-
son's doctor-patient privilege: 
(b) (4) Waiver of Privilege. 
By requesting and obtaining the examiner' s report, by 
deposing the examiner, or by commencing an a lion 
or presenting a defense which puts a party's condition 
at issue, the party examined waives any privilege it may 
have - in that action or any other act ion involving 
the same controversy - concerning testimony 
about all treatments, prescriptions, consultations, or 
examinations for the same condition. The waiver 
of any privilege does not apply to any treatment, 
consultation, prescription, or examination for any 
condition not related to the pending action: On a timely 
motion for good cause and on notice to all parties 
and the person to be examined, the court in which the 
action is pending may issue an order to prohibit the 
introduction of evidence of any such portion of any 
person's medical record not related to the pending 
action. (Emphasis added). 
The examined party-usually, but not always, the plaintiff-
who exercises his or her right to a report from or deposition 
of the Rule 35 examining physician has no "privileged" objec-
tion to a discovery request for information from the plaintiffs 
treating or litigation physicians about the same condition(s) . In 
fact, this "price" of is illusory, because the Rule then adds (out of 
chronologic order) that waiver is also triggered by "commenc-
ing an action or presenting a defense which puts the party's 
condition at issue." 
Under M.R.Civ.P. 35, a plaintiff who sues for damages, al-
leging a physical or mental injury, waives any doctor-patient 
privilege with regard to that injury when he files the complaint, 
and thereafter must upon request provide the defense with all 
medical records relating to the condition. The defendant may 
also depose a treating doctor, and may require the doctor to 
recount exactly what the patient told her about the condition, 
including its origin. The legal effect is twofold: first, there really 
is no doctor-patient privilege in personal injury cases (or other 
civil cases where a physical or mental condition is grounds for 
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either a claim or defense); second, a plaintiff should always 
request the report and/or depose the Rule 35 examiner, because 
she has already "paid" for the right. 
Callahan v. Burton, a 1971 case, was the first case to ap-
ply the Rule 35 waiver to a plaintiff who put her own medical 
condition into c ntroversy when he filed a personal injury 
action. 1he case involved a claim of medical malpractice agafost 
cu1 ophthalrnologi t for a eged failure to cUagnose malignant 
melanoma in the plaintiffs eye. The defense took the deposi-
tion of on of the plalatilfs treating physician , and then sought 
private i.11terviews with him and another of the plaintitfs do -
tors. clhe trial judge applied the then- new Rule 35, and granted 
the moti n for the interviews, reasoning that the plaintiffhad 
waived all privilege when she sued. The Montana Supreme 
Court affirmed, and in so doing explained the genesis of the 
waiver-by-filing component of Rule 35: 
The so-called physician-patient privilege is not a creature 
of the common law but is solely a creature of statute. 
Only approximately two-thirds of the states of the 
United States have adopted a privilege-communication 
statute. Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345, 
348; 8 Wigmore. Evidence, s 2380 (McNaughton rev. 
1961). 
Montana did so in 1867 by enacting Section 93-701-4, 
R.C.M.1947 ... 
The physician-patient privilege is an anachronism which 
has come under considerable criticism and attack as 
the great volume of personal injury suits increased. 8 
Wigmore, Evidence, s 2380a (McNaughton rev. 1961); 
McCormick on Evidence, s 108. 
The Montana Supreme Court notified all licensed 
attorneys in. the state fMontana that a:n amendment 
had been propo ed to Rule 35, M.R.Civ.P., which would 
abolish the privilege whenever a plaintiff commenced 
'an action whi b places in issue the mental or physical 
condition of the pa(ty brini.,•ing the action .. ,. * regarding 
the testimony of every person who bas treated, 
prescribed, consulted or examined or may thereafter 
treat, consult, prescribe or examine such patty in respect 
to the same mental or physical condition * ,.. *.' 
After notice of the proposed amendment was sent to all 
counsel, attorneys were given to and including May 25, 
1967, within which to prepare, serve and file me.n1oranda 
in opposition or in support of the proposed rnle hange. 
Ln addition, 16 lawyers were given permJssion to 
appear in oral argument at a hearing to be held on the 
proposed change June 9, 1967. ertain m difications 
of the proposed amendment were submitted. One 
proposed lhat the testimony of any treating and 
attending physician be reduced t writing at pretrial 
deposition. Another suggested amendment proposed 
that treaUng and attending physicians' testimony should 
n l il1 lude diagnosl.s, prognosis or expert opinion or 
expert testimony but should be limited solely to the facts 
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within the personal knowledge of the person. Neither 
of these amendments was adopted when the Supreme 
Court ordered the rule to be amended Sept. 29, 1967, and 
proclaimed its effective date as Jan. 1, 1968. 
Judge McClernan's order of April 28, 1970, [allowing 
defense counsel to interview plaintiffs doctors alone and 
in addition to the deposition] accorded with the new 
rules and with these concepts. 
Callahan v. Burton, 157 Mont. 513, 521-23, 487 P.2d 515, 
518-20 (1971) overruled by Jaap v. Dist. Court of Eighth Judicial 
Dist., In & For Cascade Cnty., 191Mont.319, 623 P.2d 1389 
(1981). 
Ten years later, in Jaap, the Court reversed Callahan's result, 
although it continued to find that the plaintiff had waived her 
doctor-patient privilege when she filed her personal injury 
complaint. The difference between the two cases lies solely in the 
effect of that waiver. The Jaap court reasoned that the defendant 
was conducting discovery and thus was governed by, and lim-
ited to, the discovery provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which allow for interrogatories depositions but contain no 
provision for court-compelled private interviews of treating 
physicians: 
There is no question but that under Rule 35(b)(2) 
M.R.Civ.P., as the same is promulgated iil Montana, 
Julie Jaap, by commencing an action for damages for her 
personal injuries which placed in issue the mental and 
physical condition arising from the accident, waived any 
physician-patient privilege as to her mental oi' physical 
condition in controversy. Accepting as a premise that 
the physician-patient privilege has been waived; may the 
District Court, by way of discovery, order that defense 
counsel may engage in informal, private interviews With 
the physicians treating Julie Jaap for her alleged injuries? 
Put another way, granting that plaintiff has waived 
any physician-patient privilege relating to her mental 
and physical condition in controversy, what limits, if 
any, circumscribe the power of the District Court in 
authorizing and enforcing discovery under the Montana 
Rules of Civil Procedure? 
Although we agree with that portion of the District 
Court order which stated that once the physician-
patient privilege has been waived, the physician is to be 
considered as any other witness, we conclude that the 
District Court does not have power, under the rules of 
discovery, to order private interviews between counsel 
for one party and possible adversary witnesses, expert 
or not, on the other. We derive this conclusion from an 
examination of the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to 
discovery. 
The methods by which discovery may be obtained, under 
the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, are set out in Rule 
26{a) ... 
Obviously a private interview of an adversary witness 
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is not one of the "methods" of discovery for which the 
Rules of Civil Procedure provide .... 
lt is' obvious, that if a method of discovery such as a 
private interview is ordered by the court, the sanctions 
and protections which are available under the Montana, 
Rules of Civil Proce~ure for ordinary methods of 
discovery become unavailable for private interviews .... 
We conclude therefore, that a District Court, in allowing 
and enforcing discovery in litigation before it, must 
relate the discovery to one of the methods provided in 
Rule 26(a), M.R.Civ.P. Any attempt to enforce a method 
of discovery not provided by the Montana Rules of Civil 
Procedure is outside the power of the District Court. We 
hold that the Court is without power to order a private 
interview. To do so would defeat open disclosure, a 
prime objective of the Rules of Discovery. 
Jaap v. Dist. Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., In & For 
Cascade Cnty., 191 Mont. 319, 322-324, 623 P.2d 1389, 
1391(1981). 4 
Because doctors are forbidden by their own duty of confi-
dentiality from disclosing patient information without permis-
sion of the patient or legal process, they generally will refer any 
requests for private interviews to the patient, and thus to the 
patient's attorney. Thus, as a practical matter, defense coun-
Sel can certainly invoke the waiver provisions of Rule 35, but 
can only get access to the desired information through formal 
discovery or by agreement with opposing counsel, on stipulated 
conditions. 
The Court again affirmed its allegiance to the Rule 35 waiver-
by-filing provision in a case where a mother sued for injuries to 
her minor child, asserting that the mother also suffered mental 
injuries as a result of the accident. The defense sought discov-
ery of the mother's prior medical records to test her claim as to 
inception and causation of her mental condition. The mother 
refuSed to provide full copies of the records, instead allowing 
her own doctors access to them and having them testify that 
there was no causal relationship. The trial judge denied the 
defendants' motion to compel discovery. The Supreme Court 
found this to be an abuse of discretion: 
'36 Medical records are private and "deserve the utmost 
constitutional protection." State v. Nelson (1997), 283 
Mont. 231, 242, 941P.2d441, 448. A.rticle II, Section 10, 
of the Montana Constitution guarantees informational 
privacy in the sanctity of one's medical records. Nelson, 
283 Mont. at 242, 941 P.2d at 448. However, "[w]hen 
a party claims damages for physical or mental injury, 
he or she places the extent of that physical or mental 
4 In Osterm/llerv.Alvord, 222 Mont. 208, 720 P.2d 1199 (1986), the Court distin-
guished Its holdlng In Jaall that a trial court cannot compel private Interviews 
between a plalntlff's doctor and defense counsel from the situation In that case, 
where during trial plaintiff's counsel Indicated he was not going to call plaintiff's 
treating dentist and the court then denied plaintiff's objection to a defense Inter-
view, with plaintiff's counsel present, of the dentist to prepare him for testimony In 
the defense case. 
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injury at issue and waives his or her statutory right to 
coniidentiality to the extent that it is necessary for a 
defendant to discover whether plaintiffs current medical 
or physical condition is the result of some other cause." 
State ex rel. Mapes v. District Court (1991), 250 Mont. 
524, 530, 822 P.2d 91, 94 .... 
' 39 In the present case, Kristin conunenced an action 
for damages for her personal iujmies which placed in 
issue her mental and physical condition arising from 
the accident ... .In doing this, she waived any physician-
patient privilege as to a mental or physical condition in 
controversy. Jaap, 191 Mont. at 322, 623 P.2d at 1391; 
Rule 35(b)(2), M.R.Civ.P. This includes testimony her 
physicians may have provided concerning her prior 
mental condition. Kristin did not produce records 
from before Hunter's accident because the records were 
"sensitive and personal." She did produce redacted 
medical records for the period after Hunter's accident 
which she determined were relevant. The State did 
view the redacted portion of Kristin's medical records. 
However, the State sought all Kristin's mental and 
medical health records from ten years before Hunter's 
accident (1985) through time of trial. 
'40 Kristin claims that because she provided her doctors 
with complete copies of the disputed medical records, 
and her doctors stated the record showed no causal 
correlation between any previous injury or condition 
and her current injuries, this ends the inquiry into the 
medical records. Kristin argues that the State should be 
denied access to the records because it did not present 
any expert medical opinion that her alleged injuries 
were more probably than not caused by some factor 
other than witnessing Hunter's fall. The fallacy in this 
argument is that there was no way that the State could 
have provided this opinion because it was denied access 
to the very records whlch would have enabled it to make 
this determination. The court's denial of these records 
only allowed for one-sided review of the medical records 
by Kristin's physicians. 
' 41 The State was prejudiced when it was denied the 
right to defend itself in an informed manner. It had 
the right to discover ev.idence related to prior physical 
or mental conditions possibly connected to Kristin's 
current damages. State ex rel. Mapes, 250 Mont. at 530, 
822 P.2d at 94. The State is not entitled to unnecessarily 
invade Kristin's privacy by exploring totally unrelated 
or irrelevant matters. State ex rel. Mapes, 250 Mont. at 
530, 822 P.2d at 95. However, because Kristin presented 
her entire medical records file to her treating physicians 
and asked for their expert medical opinions, which 
were at least in part based on the records which were 
denied to the defense, she waived her statutory right to 
confidentiality but only to the extent that it is necessary 
for the State to discover for itself whether Kristin's 
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current medical or physical condition is the result of 
some other cause. State ex rel. Mapes, 250 Mont. at 
530, 822 P.2d at 94. The State thus has a right to review 
Kristin's medical records to determine whether her 
present condition is attributable to some preexisting 
cause. 
'42 The similarity between Kristin's present claims 
and those for which she was previously treated shows 
the possible correlation between her pre-accident 
records and her present claims. Kristin's claims 
involve emotional distress, loss of consortium and 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The record 
indicates that prior to Hunter's accident, she was taking 
medications which can be used to treat depression, 
headaches. sleep disorders and anxiety. The connection 
between Kristin's present claims and her past conditions 
is not attenuated as it was in Mix where access to records 
was denied. Mix, 239 Mont. at 360, 781 P.2d at 756. 
Accordingly, we reverse the District Court's denial of 
the State's motion to compel production of the medical 
records. 
Henricksen v. State, 2004 MT 20, 319 Mont. 307, 317-20, 
84 P.3d 38, 48-49. 
Thus, although Montana's statute does provide a first-line 
doctor-patient privilege in civil cases, even that privilege is not 
absolute and may be waived despite the doctor's and patient's 
intent to maintain confidentiality. A person who has sought 
medical treatment necessarily must choose between confidenti-
ality and later legal redress for thatinjury or condition. Further, 
if the patient does become a plaintiff, she must realize that all of 
her prior medical records pertaining to her claimed injurywill 
be discoverable and admissible, and might involve having her 
doctor recount (unwillingly) to a jury everything she told him. 
The patient does control the waiver, but preserving the privilege 
may require her to walk away from a legal claim or defense. 
D. When doctor-patient privilege does apply 
in civil cases in Montana state courts, it covers 
only 'information necessary to enable physi-
cian, surgeon or dentist to prescribe or act for 
the patient.' 
Even before Montana was a state, the territorial court 
invoked the doctrine of strict construction of the privilege 
between doctor and patient. In Territory v. Corbett, 3 Mont. 50 
(1877), the male defendant was indicted for his marriage to his 
half-sister, Sarah Parker, who was called to testify, unwillingly, 
against him. Two doctors also testified, on the fact of sexual 
intercourse and the knowledge of the partners of the biological 
link between them. The Territorial Supreme Court refused to 
apply any privilege to their testimony: 
The evidence of Doctors Yager and Smith was properly 
admitted. The statutes of this Territory provide that a 
physician shall not testify without the consent of the 
patient as to any information he may have acquired 
while attending the same. Codified Statutes, p. 125, § 
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450. Sarah Parker and not John Corbett was the patient, 
and she gave her consent, and that was sufficient to make 
them competent witnesses. 
Physicians were not exempted at common law from 
disclosing confidential communications, confided 
to them in their professional character. Greenl. on 
Ev.,§ 247; Phill. on Ev., marg. p. 136. We are therefore 
confined strictly to the words of the statute in 
considering this point, and that, we have seen, limits 
the confidential communications to those made by the 
patient to the physician in his professional character, 
and were necessary to enable him to prescribe for the 
same. The communications made to Doctors Yager 
and Smith by the defendant do not come within the 
exemption specified in the statutes. (Emphasis added) 
Territory v. Corbett, 3 Mont. 50, 59 (1877}.5 
Conversely, when the privilege does exist, its waiver via Rule 
35 extends only to the condition in controversy: 
Nonetheless, the waiver is not unlimited; the defendant 
may only discover records related to prior physical or 
mental conditions if they relate to currently claimed 
damages. The plaintiffs right to confidentiality is 
balanced against the defendant's right to defend itself 
in an informed manner. State ex rel. Mapes, 250 Mont. 
at 530, 822 P.2d at 94. A defendant "is not entitled to 
unnecessarily invade plaintiffs privacy by exploring 
totally unrelated or irrelevant matters." State ex rel. 
Mapes, 250 Mont. at 530, 822 P.2d at 95 .... 
,- 38 A defendant is not allowed unfettered access to 
all medical records he believes may help his defense. 
In State v. Mix, the trial court refused access to records 
because the subject matter was irrelevant and too remote 
to the case. State v. Mix (1989), 239 Mont. 351, 360, 781 
P.2d 751, 756. In that case, a defendant charged with 
deliberate homicide sought medical records regarding 
the victim's asthma condition. Mix, 239 Mont. at 360, 
781 P.2d at 756. 
Henricksen v. State, 2004 MT 20, 319 Mont. 307, 317-18, 84 
P.3d 38, 48. 
E. The privilege belongs to patient, not dodor 
In Hier v. Farmers Mutual Insurance, the deceased patient's 
estate sued for payment on the fire insurance policy. The insurer 
defended on the ground that the decedent himself set the fire; 
the estate claimed that he had been insane at the time, rob-
bing him of the requisite intent to vitiate the policy. The estate 
called the insured's treating physician at trial, and the insurance 
company objected. The judge's decision to allow the testimony 
anyway was affirmed by the Supreme Court: 
5 The territorial version of the privilege statute apparently covered criminal as 
well as civil cases, but I have not gone the extra step to actually research this. 
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Dr. Cloud was called as a witness for the administrator 
and was allowed to detail the facts as to his examinations 
and treatment ofTemmel at times previous to the 
fire. He was also allowed to state his opinion as to his 
sanity. Strenuous objection was made to the admission 
of his testimony on. the ground of statutory privilege 
as contained in section 10536, subdivision 4, Revised 
Codes, which has to do with the disability of a physician 
or surgeon to testify without the consent of his patient 
in an'y civil action as to information acquired in 
attending the patient which was necessary to enable him 
to prescribe or act for the patient. In considering this 
matter we must have in mind the fact that the object of 
the statute, and of all such statutes, is not to absolutely 
disqualify a physician from testifying, but to enable 
a patient to secure medical aid without betrayal of 
confidence. 28 R.C.L. p. 542. The same authority states: 
"The patient may therefore waive objection and permit 
the physician to testify. In other words, the privilege is 
the privilege of the patient and not of the physician; 
and by the great weight of authority, if the patient 
assents the court will compel the physician to answer. 
*** The physician cannot waive the statutory privilege 
and testify against the wishes of his patient." In this 
case it must be understood that the statute could only 
apply on behalf of the patient, Temmel. It could not be 
asserted by the physician, and we fail to see wherein the 
Insurance Company had any right to assert the privilege 
as against the plaintiff in this case. It was never intended 
that such a claim of privilege could be asserted by an 
adverse party to defeat the proof of an alleged ailment 
which was a necessary element to the plaintiffs cause 
of action. 
We may assume all of the other facts of this case without 
the death of the insured and then assume that the 
insured lived to recover his sanity and thereafter brought 
suit upon the insurance policy. Unquestionably, he 
could have waived the privilege proposition and could 
have called upon the doctor to testify in the matter. In 
5 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, p. 4194, it is said: 
"By the weight of authority, however, it is held that since 
the patient may waive the privilege for the purpose of 
protecting his right, the same waiver may be made by 
those who represent him after his death, for the purpose 
of protecting rights acquired by him." (Emphasis added) 
Hier v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 104 Mont. 471, 67 P.2d 
831, 836-37 (1937). (The insurance company also argued that 
there was no "formal waiver" in the record, but the Court held 
that the tender of the doctor's evidence sufficed.) 
Federal Treatment of the Doctor-Patient Privilege 
The federal doctor-patient privilege is very different: there 
Evidence, page :l6 
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is none in federal criminal cases or in federa! civil cases where 
state law does not provide the rule of decision. The Federal 
Rules of Evidence approach privilege on a common-law basis. 
When the Advisory Committee first promulgated the FRE 
and the Supreme Court sent its draft to Congress, Article V on 
Privileges contained nine specified evidentiary privileges. (None, 
however, covered communications between a physician and a · 
patient). Congress rejected this approach and instead whittled · 
Article V down to a single rule, 501. The current version of FRE 
501, virtually unchanged since the inception of the FRE in 1975, 
states: 
RULE 501. PRIVILEGE IN GENERAL 
The common law - as interpreted by United States 
courts in the light of reason and experience -:- governs 
a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides 
otherwise: 
the United States Constitution; 
a federal statute; or 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. 
But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a 
claim or defense for which state law supplies tile rule of 
decision. 
Setting aside the last sentence of FRE 501 for now, the ques-
tion becomes whether the federal courts, in "light of reason and 
experience," hold that the communications between a doctor 
and her patient are privileged in non-diversity cases tded in 
federal court. The answer is a resounding "No." The Supreme 
Court, in a case which established a psychotherapist'-patient 
privilege for federal court, differentiated psychotherapy from 
treatment by a physician: 
Like the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege is "rooted in the 
imperative need for confidence and proceed successfully 
on the basis of a physical examination, objective 
information supplied by the patient, and the results of 
diagnostic tests. Effective psychotherapy, by contrast, 
depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust 
in which the patient is willing to make a frank and 
complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and 
fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for 
which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of 
confidential communications made during counseling 
sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this 
reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede 
development of the confidential relationship necessary 
for successful treatment. 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928, 135 
L. Ed. 2d 337 {1996). The Court recognized the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege there, but has never gone on to protect 
6 Per Jaffee, the federal privilege covers communications between a patient 
and: a licensed psychiatrist; a licensed psychologist; and a licensed cllnlcal social 
worker. 
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communications between physicians (who are not psychiatrists) 
and patients. See also, Wei v. Bodtier, 127 P.R.D. 91, 97 (D.N.J. 
i989)("ther~ is no physician-patient privilege as a matter of fed-
eral com.Inoa or statutory law."); Hutton v. City of Martinez, 219 
F.R.D. 164 (N.D.CA., 2003)(" The physician-patient privilege 
is not recognized by federal common law, federal statute, or the 
U.S. Constitution.") ' 
As the last sentence ofFRE 501 states, however, a federal 
court applies state law as to the doctor-patient privilege, in 
federal case.s where state law is used to determine liability. This 
pfovisidn is used largely but not exclusively in diversity of 
citizenship cases in federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1332. It also 
governs privilege under federal statutes which explicitly refer to 
state law, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671, 
2674. 
Federal Jlule 35 Waiver of Doctor-Patient Privilege is 
Qiffecent · · · 
·· · The current Montana version of Rule 35 was meant to mir-
ror.the federal versi~n. The Montana Commission Comment to 
the 2011 version of M.R.Civ.P. 35 states: 
. . . 
The l~nguage of Rule 35 has been amended as part of the 
ge11era1 restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more 
easily understood. The changes also have been made to 
mike.style and terminology consistent throughout these 
rules and to conform to the recent changes in the Federal 
Rules; 
The Committee has adopted Federal Rule 35 in its 
- entirety with one addition in Rule 35(b)(4) adapted 
from previous Rule 35(b)(2), limiting the waiver of 
<foctor-patient privilege in instances where treatment, 
c;onsultation, prescription, or examination relates to a 
mental or physical condition "not related to the pending 
action." 
Notwithstanding the stated intent of the Montana 
Commission to mirror F.R.Civ.P. 35, the federal version of Rule 
35 relating to privilege currently is, in fact, quite different from 
M.R.Civ.P. 35. F.R.Civ.P. 35(b)(4) provides for a waiver of the 
privilege if.the examinee requests a copy of the examination 
{eport or deposes the defense examiner, but does not further 
provide for waiver simply by filing a complaint or answer put-
ting the condition into controversy: 
(4) Waiver of Privilege. By requesting and obtaining 
the examiner's report, or by deposing the examiner, 
the party examined waives any privilege it may 
have-in that action or any other action involving the 
same controversy-concerning testimony about all 
examinations of the same condition. 
The 1970 federal Advisory Committee Note to Rule 35(b)(3) 
states: 
The subdivision also makes clear that reports of 
examining physicians are discoverable not only 
under Rule 3S(b) but under other rules as well. To be 
sure, If the report is privileged, then discovery is not 
permissible under any rule other than Rule 35(b) and it 
is permissjble under Rule 3S(b) onJy if the party requests 
a copy of the report of examination made by the other 
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party's d ctor. lier v. De Haven, 199 F.2d 777 (D.C. ir. 
1952). cert .. denied 345 U.S. 936 ( 1.953). But if the rep rt 
is un privileged and is subject to discovery under th 
pr visions of rules other than Ruf 35(b)- su b ~l s Ru lt~s 
34 or 26(b)(3) or (4)- discovcry hould not d pend 
upon wheth r the person examin d demands a opy of 
the report. 
1he key to understandi11g this apparent discrepan y be-
tween the Montana and federal Rules 35 regarding waiver of the 
privilege is in the privilege itself. Because there generally is no 
doctor-patient privilege in federal com1, there generally is noth-
ing to waive. In federal criminal cases and in most fed ral civ.il 
cases (except where state law provides the rule of decision), the 
opponent is entitled to discovery and admission of the patient's 
medical information, including the substance of hfa commu-
nications with his doctor, even over the objection of both the 
doctor and the patient. No action by the patient can establish 
a privilege, nor can any inaction (e.g., deciding not to sue) save 
the privilege. 
The language in the 1970 Note "if the report is privi-
leged" applies only to federal civil cases (primarily diversity or 
Federal Tort Claims cases) where state law governs the substan-
tive issues. Thus, in these cases, the plaintiff may be able to sue 
and still maintain privilege over her communications with her 
doctor unless and until she asks for a copy of the defense physi-
cal examination report. THERE IS A HUGE CAVEAT HERE!!! 
Remember Erie v. Tompkins Ry. ?7 Holding generally that in di-
versity cases, under the Rules of Decision Act,8 federal courts are 
supposed to apply state substantive law and federal procedural 
law? The very reason Congress inserted the last sentence into 
FRE 501 ·was to resolve any substance/procedural debate with 
regard to privilege. It did not, however, specify, whether the 
state's discovery and other procedural rules regarding a privilege 
would also trump the F.R.C.P. provisions. 
In Benally v. U.S., 216 F.R.D. 478 (2003), a patient sued 
the Indian Health Service for medical malpractice during a 
Caeserean section. The Court, in ruling on a defense motion 
for ex parte interviews with the plaintiff treating doctors, ap-
plied Ar.izona state law not only to the existence of a privilege 
but also to the discovery procedu res involvi ng tbose doctors: 
There is no physician-patient privilege under federal 
statutes, rules or common law. See Gilbreath v. 
Guadalupe Hospital Foundation, Inc., 5 F.3d 785, 791 
(5th Cir.1993). 
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, 
state law dictates federal liability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, "in civil 
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a 
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of 
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, 
State or political subdivision thereof shall be determined 
in accordance with state law." Fed. Evid. R:ule 501. 
The state of Arizona recognizes the physician-patient 
privilege. Duquette v. Superior Court, 161Ariz.269, 778 
P.2d 634 (Ariz.App.1989) .... 
7 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). 
8 28 u.s.c. 725. 
www .montanabar.org 
Under the circumstances presented here, where the state 
law provides the rule of decision, and Arizona law of 
physician-patient privilege expressly prohibits ex parte 
interviews of treating physicians as a matter of public 
policy and to preserve the integrity of the privilege, this 
Court declines to allow the ex parte interview by counsel 
for the United State~ of Plaintiffs treating physicians. 
Benally v. United States, 216 F.R.D. 478, 479-81 (D. Ariz. 
2003). See also, Hampton v. Schimpjf, 188 F.R.D. 589 (D. Mont. 
1999), where Judge Donald Molloy applied the Montana 
Suprem'e Court's Jaap holding in a federal diversity case, with-
out as much analysis of F.R.E. 501 as occurred in Benally. Of 
course, these are both federal trial court orders, which merely 
reflects one of two possible approaches to this issue. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has not yet taken a case that would resolve this 
wrinkle in privilege law, and such a case could develop from the 
difference between the Montana and federal Rules 35 regarding 
waiver of the doctor-patient privilege. 
Bottom Line: Much Uncertainty 
Montana recognizes a privilege for doctor-patient com-
munications in civil cases only, but not in criminal cases. In 
Montana civil cases, the privilege is easily waived if litigation 
involves the condition for which the communication was made. 
The federal courts do not recognize any doctor-patient privi-
lege, but will apply a state privilege if the case is ultimately to be 
decided through state substantive law. When the federal courts 
do recognize the privilege, it is not clear whether the state or the 
federal version of Rule 35, with its waiver language, will apply. 
Of course, each tribal court also has its own law about doctor-
patient privilege (which I simply do not have room to lay out 
here). Could you pass a pop quiz on the status of the doctor-
patient privilege? Or even a true/false test question: "There is 
a doctor-patient privilege in Montana"? And you are a lawyer, 
with three years oflaw study and some actual legal practice. 
What is a non-lawyer to do? 
The purpose of every privilege is to encourage full and frank 
communication between the parties to the specified relation-
ship, to achieve sorpe societally desirable end. That end, where 
the doctor-patient privilege is recognized, is full information to 
the physician so that the patient's medical health can be opti-
mized. Unfortunately, when the patient avails herself of medical 
advice, she usually can't predict if there will be litigation involv-
ing the condition and if so, in which court system and which 
type of case. Without this information, it is impossible to predict 
whether or not her statements to her doctor can be discovered 
and used against her. 
In ruling that the federal courts should recognize a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, the U.S. Supreme Court observed 
that a large majority of states had such a privilege and that fact 
was relevant to the Court's decision: 
In addition, given the importance of the patient's 
understanding that her communications with her 
therapist will not be publicly disclosed, any State's 
promise of confidentiality would have little value if 
the patient were aware that the privilege would not 
Evidence, page 28 
Page 27 
Evidence, from previous page 
be honored in a federal court.12 Denial of the federal 
privilege therefore would frustrate the purposes of 
the state legislation that was enacted to foster these 
confidential communications. 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. l, 13, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1930, 135 
L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996).9 
The Court also stressed the need for certainty as to the exis-
tence and extent of any privilege, at the time the communication 
is made: 
As we explained in Upjohn, if the purpose of the privilege 
is to be served, the participants in the confidential 
conversation "must be able to predict with some degree 
of certainty whether particular discussions will be 
protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports 
to be certain but results in widely varying applications 
by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all." 
(Citation omitted). 
518 U.S. at 18, 116 S.Ct. at 1932. The current situation with 
9 Justice Scalla's dissent on this point is characteristically caustic: "This Is a novel 
argument indeed. A sort of Inverse pre-emption: The truth-seeking functions of 
federal courts must be adjusted so as not to conflict with the policies of the States. 
This reasoning cannot be squared with Giiiock, which declined to recognize an evl-
dentlary privilege for Tennessee legislators In federal prosecutions, even though 
the Tennessee Constitution guaranteed It In state criminal proceedings. Giiiock, 
445 U.S., at 368, 100 S.Ct., at 1191. Moreover, since, as I shall discuss, state policies 
regarding the psychotherapist privilege vary considerably from State to State, no 
uniform federal policy can possibly honor most of them. If furtherance of state 
policies is the name of the game, rules of privilege In federal courts should vary 
from State to State, a la Erle R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 
1188 (1938):' 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 24-25, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1935, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996) 
regard to the doctor-patient privilege in Montana, despite a 
nominally simple privilege statute, is exactly what the Supreme 
Court prophesied: functionally uncertain, even though it 
may purport to be certain. It is "little better than no privilege 
at all" because it does not provide any clear guidance to the 
beneficiary of the privilege at the time she must decide what to 
communicate. 
Lessons for the patient 
The doctor-patient privilege is much more limited than most 
patients, and perhaps doctors, realize. Although the doctor in-
tends to keep confidential what her patient tells her, she cannot 
do so: 
• where the patient is involved in a criminal proceeding in 
Montana state court; 
• where the patient later bases a legal claim or defense on 
the condition in a civil proceeding in Montana state court; 
• where the patient is the subject of a Rule 35 examination 
in Montana or federal court, and requests a copy of the report 
of, or deposes, the examiner; 
• where the patient is involved in any proceeding, civil or 
criminal, in federal court, except the relatively few cases where 
state law provides the rule of decision. 
Neither the doctor nor the patient is likely to know at the 
time of the appointment which type of court proceedings, and 
thus whether in fact any privilege will protect the communica-
tions made in the appointment. Given this situation, the patient 
should assume there is no doctor-patient privilege at all, and 
thus that anything she says to her doctor may be used against 
her by her adversary in some future court proceeding. 
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law 
where she teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies. 
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a shock to Pat, his brothers say no one is more 
deserving. 
"He's devoted his life to representing people 
who might not have a voice in our courts," 
Thomas said. "He certainly is not afraid to pick 
up the argument for people who might not have 
a voice. That is in the finest tradition of our 
profession. 
BEA STAR 
WITH THE BAR 
"When he told me about the award, I said, 
'Well deserved. And maybe a little bit overdue." 
When asked what he has been most proud of 
over the course of his career, Pat McKittrick said 
it is being able to be of service to the working men 
and women of Montana. 
'Tm very proud of representing the working 
person throughout my entire career and being 
able to help quite a few of the working people 
throughout the years," Pat said. "It's been a won-
derful career. That feeling of accomplishment of 
helping people in their time of conflict and need 
has been very rewarding." 
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The Bozeman rock band The Buzztnnes will be performing 
at the Wednesday, Sept. 24. opening reception far the 
4Dth Annual Meeting in Big Sky. 
The opening reception will be at Buck's T-4 Lodge 
(about a mile past the Big Sky turn off) 
from 5 to 7 p.m. 
Some of the members of The Buzztones are also local attorneys. 
The band would welcome any cameo performers to sing or play an 
instrument on a song or two. If you are interested in joining the band 
onstage. contact Buzz Tarlow at 406-586-9714 before Aug. 30 
to discuss your possibilities of stardom. 
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